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THIE REBIRTH OF THE COMMERCIAL FACTOR 
Perhaps the commercial factor did not die; perhaps he only seemed 
to as the spot light shifted to other actors. At one time he had a hand 
in most of the world's commerce; indigo, hemp, cotton and iron, sugar, 
shellac, tobacco, pepper, corn, and rum, these things and many others 
came into the English ports consigned to the factor for sale.1 On the 
outgoing voyage he, or his ubiquitous brother the supercargo, handled 
the glass beads,2 the cutlery, fire water and calico designed to bring 
civilization, at a price, to the customers contacted by the missionary. 
It was he also who marketed the antelope, beaver and buffalo skins of 
which the west was despoiled last century,3 and later the mess-pork, 
lard, flour, cattle, hides and lumber produced by the pioneer. The factor 
was an important person in his day. Once, indeed, he was widely 
discussed in legal literature, but that was some time ago. 
Considered in retrospect this demise-or seeming demise-of the 
commercial factor is logical enough. The displacement of the sailing 
vessel by steam, of the pack train and freighter by the railroad, of the 
messenger and a leisurely post by telegraph, cable and wireless, of word 
of mouth selling by national advertising, all have served to bring buyer 
and seller closer together. The movement increasingly to standardize 
manufactured products, and in recent years to grade the "raws," though 
less spectacular, has been fully as significant. So with a stabilized 
exchange!4 But it was probably the onrush of the corporation and 
industrialism which did more than anything else to squeeze the factor 
to the wall. Capable of buying direct in large quantities-or of owning 
outright the sources of supply-and on the selling side of dominating5 
"wholesaler," "jobber" and "dealer," there was little place left for the 
1 How early the factor appeared is not certain-if important-but at all events 
he had long been prominent in trading circles by the 17th century. See MALYNES, 
LEX MERCATORIA (3d ed. 1681) c. 16. 
2 See Godfrey v. Saunders, 3 Wils. K. B. 94 (1770) involving a shipment of 
"coral beads" to the East Indies in 1754. 
'See Argersinger v. MacNaughton, 114 N.Y. 535, 21 N. E. 1022 (1889), a 
case involving a quantity of antelope skins. 
'So also with sound banking-and with the various commodity exchanges. 
5 Of course this "domination" is not complete, as witness the recent failure of 
resale price legislation in New York. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy, Inc., 
269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936). And, equally, the effort to gain control by 
making the merchant appear both as "factor" or agent and as "buyer" has been 
disappointing. Frick Co. Inc. v. Walter Cox Co., Inc., 199 N. E. 462 (Ind. App. 
1936). See further, Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 
2 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 501, 518. 
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factor"-though it is true he still survived in relatively out of the way 
places,7 and under a different name, as the commission merchant. 
It comes with a feeling of surprise-and some vexation-therefore, 
to find that in the textile field at least, not only has the factor survived 
all these years, but that he has quite suddenly reached the stage of big 
business. According to report of James Talcott, Inc., first established in 
1854, it alone "factored" some $68,162,010 of business last year.8 
Moreover, not content with textiles, these new factors are reaching out 
into different fields for other commodities: rubber goods, electrical 
appliances, furs, shoes, gloves, fuel oil and what not. The vexation no 
doubt arises in part from having been so mistaken as to have supposed 
such a development impossible. And the suggestion of Mr. Achelis, 
president of one of the largest companies, that the business has been 
there all the time, waiting, one gathers, only the hand of business genius 
to be brought forth and entered in the profit ledger-even during a 
depression-does not help matters much.9 
But the quarrel goes deeper! One's initial reaction-that is, if one's 
reactions were conditioned during the long pre-war fight10 against the 
"high cost of living," which seems in outcome to have aided so much 
in bringing about the very large business enterprise-is, that once again 
6A great many illustrations could be given, the growth of the large milling 
and baking interests, which substantially occupy the flour trade, being one. The 
American Woolen Company was a merger of a number of independent mills and 
now does its own financing and selling. See generally Weld, Marketing Agencies 
Between Manufactwrer and Jobber (1917) 31 QUART. J. ECON. 571, 576. That 
writer concludes that "marketing intermediaries are bound to continue in existence 
indefinitely, especially to serve the smaller manufacturers," but that they are 
decreasing in importance "in the textile trades where mills are becoming less and 
less dependent on commission houses for financial support." 
T This no doubt overstates the matter, for in the produce trade alone-thanks 
to modern refrigeration-over a million cars of fresh fruits and vegetables were 
marketed last year, a large portion on a commission basis. NEWTON, CONSIGN- 
MENT MARKETING (1935) 1. A discussion of produce marketing is outside the 
scope of the present paper. 
8This figure appears in the company's prospectus submitted to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission on February 21, 1936. The 1935 volume of "factoring" 
by subsidiaries of the Commercial Investment Trust (Comimercial Factors Corpora- 
tion, Meinhard, Greef and Co., and William Iselin & Co.) has been reported at $245,008,986 in the official report of the corporation, Feb. 1, 1936-Poor's Daily 
Repgrts-Fiscal Companies, at 1836. These, with the Textile Banking Co. (the 
factoring subsidiary of Commercial Credit Company, which on Feb. 5, 1936 re- 
ported a 1935 factoring volume of $99,118,019-(Id. at 1818) are probably the 
largest concerns now operating in the field. See generally Sales for Sale (Jan. 
1933) 7 FORTUNE 70. 
9Achelis, The Factor Finds Fresh Fields (April, 1935) 23 NATION's BUSINESS 
32. At page 72 he says: "Evidently many concerns in many industries could always 
have benefited by factoring. But for more than a hundred years it was taken for 
granted that factoring was applicable only to the various branches of the textile 
industry-silk, cotton, wool, and later, rayon." 
10 See for example, Arbuthnot, The Factor Systen, as Related to Industrial 
Combinations (1907) 15 J. POL. ECON. 577. Factoring as here discussed, however, 
had to do with manufacturer control of dealers, quite a different matter. 
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there has been introduced a "middleman," and that, to no discernible 
economic good." The complaint is of long standing. In the words of 
one who wrote so long ago as 1692 concerning the Blackwell Hall fac- 
tors: "Here are a considerable Party of Men that flourish like Solomon's 
Lillies, that neither toyle nor spin, that only get a Profit out of the 
Wool, and no way encourage the Woolen-Manufacture. .."12 One 
gathers that the writer was largely concerned with the hard case of the 
manufacturer in the grip of the factor, a matter of some solicitude 
even today. But as applied to the position of the consumer today the 
quotation should perhaps cause even more concern. Why should the 
textile factor still flourish, and his numbers increase? 
It is difficult for a lawyer, moreover, to credit fully the suggestion 
that business initiative alone is at the bottom of this rebirth. Often 
the legislature has lent a helping hand. And, however ardently the 
lawyer may espouse a laissez faire philosophy-at least as respects the 
hand of the legislator-he cannot have read far without discovering that 
the courts have themselves built a very substantial legal footing for any 
business that bids fair to prosper. This the factor and possibly his 
lawyer are prone to take for granted, as the law of nature so to speak. 
In other circles it has become commonplace to say that laissez faire is 
evidently to be abandoned without ever having been tried.13 But, how- 
ever that may be, it is evident that before one can evaluate the position 
of this "new factor," some investigation must first be made of the 
legal basis for his business. Possibly also, since we are assured that the 
common law is the perfection of all reason, we need not inquire further. 
The outcry against the textile factor of the 17th century resulted 
finally in an act of Parliament.'4 He was to be regulated! It seems he 
had been selling on unduly long credit terms, that he had been slow in 
remitting to the clothier, in fact, that he had used these remittance 
monies to buy wool to sell to the clothier at a profit. The further 
charge was made, moreover,-and it is not without counterpart even 
today-that he used these and other means to ruin the manufacturer, 
and so to acquire his business. To a society only just changing from 
a rationing economy, whose main effort was to assure the populace ade- 
quate food and clothing, these were serious charges. The act, adopted 
in 1695, therefore required the factor to be licensed, limited strictly the 
credit terms on which sales could be made, provided for periodical re- 
"See CONVERSE, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING (1931) 14 for a discussion of "the 
puzzle of high marketing costs." 
'CLOTHIERS COMPLAINT (1692) 26. 
1 Coker, Property Rights as Obstacles to Progress (1936), ANNALS, May 1936: 
"No one, I believe, expects us now to undertake the untried experiment of laissez 
faire." 
148 & 9 WM. III, c. 9 (1695). 
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ports of sales and goods on hand, insisted upon prompt remittances,- 
and, shortly became a dead letter. Possibly we would say today that it 
was "unconstitutional," as attempting to hold too close a rein on private 
initiative.'5 At all events the factor was able to circumvent it; first 
by dealings with the poorer merchants, promising them prompt sales 
and, in the case of sales on credit, by himself guaranteeing the account, 
for a commission.16 But, at least, the unduly acquisitive spirit may have 
been somewhat chastened. 
The factor's next important brush with the authorities, only 50 odd 
years later, did not involve textiles at all, but logwood brought to 
England by ship. The forum was different, being that of the Chancery 
Court, Lord Hardwicke presiding, and "the great Question in the cause 
was, Supposing Mico [the factor] had a lien on these goods and prod- 
uce, so as to be entitled to retain them for the balance of the account; 
whether he has not parted with that right?" The case being in bank- 
ruptcy the court was inclined "to equality," but desired the opinion of 
four merchants in court as witnesses "upon the custom and usage" re- 
lating to such matters. Here, obviously, was a sympathetic hearing to 
learn the needs of business. The merchants were very clear, that, where 
there was a general account between factor and principal, the factor 
might retain both ship and cargo not only for particular charges but 
for any balance due on the general account. But in this case the factor 
had turned over the goods to his principal's broker and in such event 
"it is safer for trade" to deny the lien. "It is better to allow that which 
is the public notorious transaction, than that which is secret." Though 
Mico lost his case, the factor's general lien, based on possession, had 
been established, which was no small gain.17 
It is instructive to note how easily and with what little publicity 
this bit of law was made. It is only fair to say, of course, that English 
commerce had expanded greatly in the preceding half century and that 
a decision denying the factor a general lien-particularly as respects 
logwood shipped in from out of country-might have caused much 
greater notoriety. As might be expected Lord Mansfield was quick 
to approve. Within three years, in 1758, he wrote: "I take it to be now 
a settled [sic] point, that a factor to whom a balance is due, has a lien 
upon all goods of his principal, so long as they remain in his posses- 
sion. '18 And by 1775, not only had the textile factor taken over the 
"5A number of recent cases could be cited. 
16 For an excellent discussion of the whole manoeuvre see WESTERFIELD, MID- 
DLEMEN IN ENGLISH BUSINESS (1915) 296 et seq. 
17 Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252 (Ch. 1755). That this was the turning point 
case is attested by Lord Mansfield in Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 2218 (1768). 
18 Godin et al v. London Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 489, 494 (1758). 
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lien for his own uses, but it was extended for him to include "a lien 
on the price of goods in the hands of the buyer"'19 as well. Though the 
factor "had not the actual possession" of the goods, "yet as he had a 
power of giving a discharge, or bringing an action, he had a right to 
retain the money"20 paid to him by the buyer, in spite of notice not to 
do so from the clothier's assignees. 
The frank-or at best thinly disguised-partnership between the 
law courts and the commercial classes at this time evolved a highly 
dynamic philosophy. In the words of Buller, J., "quick circulation, is 
the life and soul of trade,"'21 and that trade should be promoted, even 
though at considerable strain to accepted legal doctrine, these judges 
never doubted. Why was the factor given a general lien? For the 
very good reason, according to Chambre, J., that his being given one 
would "encourage factors to advance money upon goods in their posses- 
sion, or which must come into their hands as factors," a result necessary 
"for the convenience of trade."22 Nothing could be more explicit. It 
is not suggested that this conclusion be criticized, but rather that it be 
lauded, for a whole colonial empire lay at hand awaiting "development." 
While the lien concept may, as Ames suggests,23 have grown up because 
of the inadequacies of the early action of assumpsit, the factor's version, 
at least, was to live and have being for the very definite functional 
purpose of promoting trade. 
The actual philosophy behind the first Factors Act,24 passed in 
1823, is not entirely clear. On the surface at least it was to reverse 
the case of Paterson v. Tash,25 which being decided in 1743, had per- 
haps not fully appreciated the factor's commercial importance. The 
court had there held that a factor could not "affect the property" in his 
principal's goods "by pledging them as a security for his own debt."26 
Drinkwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp. 251, 256 (1775). The case is interesting as 
an out and out financing arrangement with the "factors lien" used as a security 
device only. 
24Id., at 256. It is interesting to note that nothing was said of the factor hold- 
ing the receivable as an assignee of a chose in action. 
'Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East 20, 35 (1793). And again: "One great point 
to be kept uniformly in view is to make the circulation and negociation of prop- 
erty as quick, as easy, and as certain as possible." 
2 Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & P. 485, at 488 (1803). 
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN His- 
TORY (1909) 259, at 289. Speaking of the tailor's position under the early law in 
the absence of express contract, Ames says: "having no remedy by action, he was 
allowed a lien, to prevent intolerable hardship." And, one may guess also, in order 
to preserve the peace. Even when the action in implied quantumn meruit was 
created, or "discovered" as Ames would have it, it did not displace the innkeeper's 
old remedy of lien. Watbrooke v. Griffith, Moore, 876 (K. B. 1609). Perhaps 
tailors and innkeepers, like factors, were to be encouraged. 
24 GEO. IV, c. 83 (1823). 
252 Strange 1178 (1743). 
25 Ibid. 
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Possibly this position would have become untenable in time, though 
curiously it was reaffirmed in 1794, Grose, J. even saying that in his 
opinion "it is a wise rule."27 In 1812 the case of Pickering v. Busk28 
had indicated that the "apparent authority" doctrine might well come 
to be widely enough expanded to reverse the Paterson case. So, why 
wait? especially as it was still "necessary to trade" that the factor be 
encouraged to make advances to his principal. The Factors Act simply 
closed one eye to the point that money raised on one man's goods might 
reach quite a different shipper-or reach none at all. The other eye, 
possibly, was already on the "needs" of the commercial banker. 
At all events, it was this English law, in the broad sense, which 
set the pattern for the growing commerce of the colonists at the close 
of the 18th century. The factor's lien seems to have been accepted more 
or less as a matter of course by Kent, C. J. in 1809, when he extended 
it to cover ship and cargo in the hands of the factors' New York agent 
on the return voyage.29 Previously, in 1804, Judge Bushrod Wash- 
ington of the newly organized Federal judiciary had even gone so far 
as to permit a factor, who had waived his lien, to retain the proceeds 
of certain tobacco shipments and "offset" them on obligations of the 
shipper planters.30 But this is perhaps best understood as Federalist3l 
law. The development did not stop with recognition of the selling 
factor's lien, however, for in a series of cases beginning with the 
Massachusetts decision of Stevens v. Robins32 in 1815, the buying factor 
likewise was given not only a specific but a general lien on goods pur- 
chased for his principal. The prevailing Federalist politics of the time 
was not averse to any argument having as its object the promotion of 
trade. 
The factor's lien being thus established, the question to be see-sawed 
back and forth across the next hundred years had to do with determin- 
ing the point of time at which it first attached. According to Chambre, 
J., factors should be encouraged not only to make loans against goods 
in possession but against those "which must come into their hands as 
27 Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R. 604 (1794). There was other strong support for 
this view. In Queiroz v. Trueman, 3 B. & C. 342, 351 (1824), Bayley, J. said the 
rule had "operated much to increase the foreign commerce of this kingdom" by 
affording a safeguard to the foreign merchant. 
' 15 East 38 (1812). 
9 Urquhart v. M'Ivor, 4 Johns. 103 (N. Y. 1809). 
3 Marks v. Barber, 16 Fed. Cas. No. 9096 (Circ. Ct. Pa. 1804). 
1 See generally, BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON (1925). For discussion 
of the early "levelling" laws of the colonies, see Baird, New Deal Laws in Colonial 
Days (1935) 9 CONN. BAR J. 187. 
32 12 Mass. 180 (1815), a case involving purchase of sole leather. See also 
Bryce & Bennie v. Brooks, 26 Wend. 367 (N. Y. 1841). Here the factor had 
bought rollers for printing calico. 
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f actors."33 The question had political aspects; how far could the com- 
mercial factor's lien be pushed forward in the transaction without up- 
setting notions of fair dealing and law developed in a more static 
agricultural economy? How elastic was the requirement of possession? 
In the great case of Haille v. Smith et al.,34 involving a cargo of hemp 
and iron to London, resort was had once more to eminent merchants 
for guidance, two this time. In their view it was decisive of the case 
that the factor had received the bills of lading, for in ocean commerce 
it was usual in their experience for merchants to accept on faith of such 
documents. It was ruled accordingly by Eyre, C. J., that the factor took 
the cargo as against the shipper's bankrupt estate. Actual physical 
custody was evidently not to be insisted on. 
I But Haille v. Smith was decided in a sea borne commerce atmos- 
phere. Only six years before, in Kinlock v. Craig,35 a case involving a 
shipment of spirits from Scotland, the factors, or their trustee in bank- 
ruptcy, for both shipper and factors had failed before the goods arrived, 
was denied a lien. "Though the bankrupts might have given their ac- 
ceptances on the faith that these consignments would be made to them, 
yet still it was an executory agreement, for the non-performance of 
which only a right of action accrued," and "no property in the goods 
was thereby vested in them."36 No bills of lading figured in the case. 
And in 1817, in Nichols v. Clent,37 a case involving a shipment of flour 
being sent to Bristol by trow, the factor again lost, although on receipt 
of the miller's letter of advice he had accepted bills against the con- 
signment. Granted that the factors were correctly dealt with in Kinlock 
v. Craig, this was a case "a multo fortiori," for "how could the letters 
give them an equitable right to the goods in the trow."38 Evidently 
the factor was not to be greatly encouraged to make advances on do- 
mestic transactions, unless he got actual possession; bills of lading 
were not widely used. 
The infant textile industry provided the setting for the first cases 
on the point in this country. In 1834 a Providence thread maker de- 
livered 10 boxes of cotton thread to a wagoner to take to Boston and 
leave at the City tavern where he was accustomed to put up. The 
thread arrived in the evening and was attached by creditors of the 
shipper, the sheriff storing it temporarily in the harness room. But it 
appeared that the manufacturer had reached Boston in the morning of 
3 See Houghton v. Mathews, 3 Bos. & P. 485, 488 (1803). 
" 1 Bos. & P. 563 (1796). 
353 T.R. 119 (1789), 3 T.R. 783 (1790). 
3 See 3 T.R. 783, 787 (1790). 
3 3 Price 547 (1817). 
3 See 3 Price 547, 571 (1817). 
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the same day and procured an advance from the factor with whom he 
usually traded against an invoice of the shipment. No bill of lading 
was involved, but the waybill showed simply that the goods were to be 
left at the tavern. On this state of facts, Shaw, C. J., was clear that 
nothing had happened to change the "legal possession" of the manufac- 
turer and the factor accordingly lost.39 Delivery to the carrier was not 
delivery to the factor, since delivery was not made pursuant to a previ- 
ous agreement. 
The needs of the textile business were made very much more ap- 
parent to the New York court in 1840 and 1841 when Holbrook v. 
Wight40 and Grosvenor v. Phillips4' were decided by Cowen, J. In 
the first case, 14 boxes of "sattinets" had been sent by the mill in 
Middlebury, Vt., to forwarding agents in Troy marked with the fac- 
tor's name. In the second, brown cloth, manufactured in Auburn, New 
York, had been delivered to the Auburn & Syracuse Rail-Road Company 
for transshipment at Syracuse by canal to New York. In both cases 
invoices were sent promptly to the factor, describing the goods in de- 
tail, but no bill of lading appears to have been used in either case. And 
while advances made in the Holbrook case appear to have been more or 
less closely allocated to the shipments, the factor was already in advance 
to the mill in the Grosvenor case and made no specific advance on the 
goods in question. What should be done? In the first case the jury 
came to the factor's rescue with a finding that the shipping agent in- 
tended to hold for the consignee, but in the Grosvenor case it was de- 
cided as matter of law, that, in this situation, the factor's claim was 
superior to that of execution creditors. 
How rationalize such a result? Obviously it could not be said to 
depend upon lien, for here certainly was no actual possession and, at 
best, but a shadowy constructive possession in the factor. He was, it 
was argued, but "a mere commission dealer," entitled to no more con- 
sideration than any other unsecured creditor. Forced to abandon the 
"lien" rationale the court resorted to a more potent one,-the factor had 
acquired "a vested interest"42 in the goods. There was precedent, 
moreover, for Evre, J., had said in Haille v. Smith: "From the moment 
the goods were set apart for this particular purpose, why should we 
not hold the property in them to have been changed, it being in perfect 
conformity to the agreement, and such an execution thereof as the 
justice of the case requires ?"43 That the factor in the Grosvenor case 
'Baker v. Fuller, 38 Mass. 318 (1838). 
'424 Wend. 169 (N. Y. 1840). 
412 Hill 147 (N. Y. 1841). 
"Id., at 151. 
4 See 1 Bos. & P. 563, at 570 (1796). 
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had received no bill of lading was a minor matter, for "there is no magic 
in such a document, especially as between the original parties."" 
At all events here was "law" enough to suit the factor's needs for 
the time. And, although some courts had trouble in seeing how the 
factor could have "property,"-inasmuch as the consignor obviously 
had the "risk"45 still the result was widely approved.46 Nor, as might 
be expected, was it the textile factor alone who benefitted. In 1850, 
Taney, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court, was even more explicit 
in guarding the New York factor's rights to some 350 barrels of mess 
port which had been attached while in warehouse at Fort Wayne, In- 
diana, awaiting the opening of transportation in the spring. "To the 
extent of his advances he is a purchaser, and the legal title was conveyed 
to him to protect his advances."47 Why this apparent solicitude for the 
factor? Because, the transaction represented "the usual course of the 
great inland commerce by which the larger part of the agriculture pro- 
ductions of the valley of the Mississippi find their way to market" and 
a decision adverse to the factor "would certainly be not less injurious 
to the agriculturist and producer than to the merchant and trader."48 
The west, too, needed money. 
It is a fair hunch that much the same thought operated also to vest 
the buying factor with the "property" in goods purchased for his prin- 
cipal; but the record is not so clear. At all events, in the great case of 
Farmers and Merchants' National Bank v. Logan,49 decided in 1878 by 
the New York court, the result depended on finding "property"-a lien 
no longer would suffice-in Sears and Daw, the "commission mer- 
chants" who had acted for their New York principal in buying a canal 
boat load of wheat at Buffalo. Although Folger, J., conceded that the 
principal had the profit and loss risk, still he found with a perfectly 
straight face that Sears and Daw had the "property."50 It followed, 
"See 2 Hill 147, 152 (N. Y. 1841). 
4 Indeed, the matter of "risk" in the consignor had been mentioned in Haille 
v. Smith, 1 Bos. & P. 563 (1796) but the point was not thought of sufficient im- 
portance to affect the factor's "property." But in Elliott v. Bradley, 23 Vt. 217 
(1851) it was enough to cause the Vermont court to deny the New York factor 
any "title" to cloth against which advances had been made. Only four years later, 
however, in Davis & Aubin v. Bradley & Co., 28 Vt. 118 (1855), the case was dis- 
tinguished by finding a "constructive possession" in the factor, under closely similar 
circumstances, and so a "lien" for his advances. 
" But it must be granted the basis was usually by finding a "lien." See gen- 
erally, Desha, Sheppard & Co. v. Pope & Son, 6 Ala. 690 (1844); Elliott v. Cox, 
48 Ga. 39 (1873); Warren v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus 149 Ill. 9, 38 N. E. 
122 (1893); Rosenbaum Bros. & Co. v. Hayes, 5 N. D. 476, 67 N. W. 951 (1896). 
4 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 400 (U. S. 1850). 
48 Id., at 399. 
4974 N.Y. 568 (1878). 
' The security nature of this "property" interest on the part of the "buying" 
factor was set out later more clearly by the court in Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y. 
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moreover, that the plaintiff bank likewise got the factor's property on 
taking the bill of lading, for certainly such was the intent of the parties. 
The next step was a longer one, but it was taken in stride, the "prop- 
erty," moreover, was not lost by giving over the goods into the custody 
of the principal-buyer on a limited authority. So was born the trust- 
receipt, which is a different story, but the idea of a split property con- 
cept has since become quite orthodox in sales law.51 
But the Farmers Bank case was also evidence that factoring had 
two distinct sides: one financing, the other merchandising; and that, 
moreover, with improved transportation and a developing railroad bill 
of lading,52 the banker was prepared to take an increasing share in the 
former. Of course, the early case of Haille v. Smith, in which the 
banker had made advances under an arrangement whereby goods would 
be shipped to his factor-affiliate for sale-and as security-had shown 
that these functions might easily be separated. Whether it was to meet 
the banker threat, or because some factors rather fancied themselves in 
the role of banker, is not clear, but it is well established that by the close 
of the century a good deal had been happening in the business of the 
textile factor. Some had come to concern themselves principally with 
accounts, while others had gravitated to the selling side; thus making 
two "lillies,"1 so to speak, to grow where but one had grown before. 
The famous Ryttenberg v. Schefer53 litigation marks the transition. 
While the case did not get beyond Holt, J., in the District Court, it none- 
theless spread consternation in the ranks of the financing factors, or 
their lawyers. Evidently, what was lacking-if anything-in judicial 
sanction was made up for by the eminence of opposing counsel. The 
action was brought on behalf of the bankrupt estate of Radon & Co., 
Benjamin N. Cardozo of counsel, to recover the proceeds of certain 
goods and receivables in the hands of the "factor," Shefer, Schram & 
Vogel, represented by Charles E. Hughes of counsel. It seems Radon 
& Co. had acted as factors for various mills, both selling for and 
financing them, but had turned over the financing part of this business 
to Schefer and more recently had been engaging directly in the pur- 
chase and sale of goods, again using Schefer as a financing agency. 
129, 136, 30 N. E. 732, 734 (1892): "The correspondent's position is one of owner- 
ship so far only as is necessary to secure him for the advances he made upon the 
merchandise described in the bill of lading, and in such a case as this he is bound 
to sell upon receipt of the purchase-price from the principal, or in other words, 
upon receipt of the amount he advanced upon its credit. In no other sense is the 
correspondent the owner of the property." 
"1UNIFORM SALES ACT ? 20 (2). 
53In Bailey v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70 (1872) the factor had 
won, but it was pointed out very clearly that, if the shipper had dicounted his bills 
of lading with a banker, the latter's rights to the goods would be superior. 
' 131 Fed. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
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Schefer had taken the precaution, for what it should prove to be worth, 
to have Radon & Co. assign over the lease to the premises where the 
goods were stored and had put up a sign, "Schefer, Schram & Vogel, 
Annex," at the entrance. In this situation the court had little trouble as 
respects the goods for which Radon & Co. acted as selling agent; these 
had been consigned directly to Schefer and it was decided that both 
the goods and the receivables arising from them were subject to the 
Schefer claim. Of course, so much, at least, was to be expected if the 
factor's lien-or "property"-meant anything whatever. 
The crux of the case had to do with the Schefer position as respects 
the goods owned by Radon & Co., and the receivables arising upon 
their sale. Advances up to 6623 per cent. had been made on these goods 
against a statement saying they were "consigned" to Schefer and upon 
their sale-by Radon & Co.-up to 75% on the receivables. In addi- 
tion, Schefer further guaranteed the solvency of these accounts, in- 
tending to assume in this way an obligation similar to that of a del 
credere factor. Bills to customers went out with Schefer's name at the 
top, and remittances were customarily made to him. Actually all that 
had happened was that the financing and the selling functions of the old 
time factor had been severed, but, in the process, what was to become 
of the lien-or "property" interest-of the factor? There was no 
question of the intent and good faith of the parties and obviously the 
transaction was more or less open and notorious. 
It is difficult to recreate at this date the atmosphere in which this 
case was decided, or to determine exactly what furnished the emotional 
bent of the court in refusing to accord Schefer a security position, as 
it did.54 The situation was new to the court. One gathers that Holt, J., 
did not see how Schefer could be called a "factor" at all, since he did 
not sell.55 Nor, was the word "consigned" on the statement sufficient 
to constitute a consignment, for a "man cannot consign a thing to an- 
other by merely saying that he consigns it, any more than he can deliver 
it by mere words."56 Thus, not content with doubting that Schefer was 
a factor, the court was further of the opinion that he had not obtained 
that possession of the goods requisite to a lien. As for the receivables, 
the ancient Mansfield lien upon the "price"57 went out with the lien 
'The court mentions at the outset that if Schefer's claim were sustained in 
full there would be no funds available to pay general creditors-or presumably the 
costs of administration. Id., at 317. There is, of course, no suggestion that this 
may have influenced the decision. 
5 This attitude is reflected more clearly in the case of Ommen v. Talcott, 188 
Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911), which came up very soon after. Here (at 403), 
Lacombe, J., said, as though the matter were important, "we cannot find out that 
defendant ever sold a dollar's worth of the bankrupt's goods." 
See 131 Fed. 313, 321 (S. D. N. Y. 1904). 
6 See supra note 19. 
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upon the goods and, there being no express assignment, no other basis 
for a claim upon them was left. Apparently "promotion of trade" was 
no longer the overweening purpose of the court. 
It would have been relatively easy for the court-had it been so 
minded-to have ruled in the words of Taney, C. J., that the factor had 
obtained a "title" to the goods. As for the point that the purported 
"consignment" was no "delivery," it is, of course, a commonplace of 
sales law that delivery of specific goods is not essential to the buyer's 
title.58 But Holt, J., did not see how this position could be reconciled 
with the holdings that the consignor has a preferred claim to goods in 
his factor's hands-over and above the factor's lien interest-upon the 
factor's insolvency.59 Moreover, counsel appear to have been of two 
minds, for they evidently insisted most strenuously on the inconsistent 
possessory lien position, relying upon their device of an assigned lease 
to carry the day. But as to this it was enough for the court to say: "A 
court of equity looks through the form to the substance."00 Evidently 
the notion that "equality is equity," which Lord Hardwick had so long 
ago subordinated in favor of the factor's lien, was once more to have 
sway. 
The case of Ommen v. Talcottll which grew out of a similar bank- 
ruptcy in 1902 was even more positive in condemning the "assigned 
lease" as a means of obtaining "possession." And this, in spite of the 
fact that an employee of Talcott, the alleged factor, had gone through 
the ceremony of demanding the keys to the premises and then of hand- 
ing them back again to be held for the lessee. In addition, at the trial, 
"four" eminent merchants were again produced, according to the best 
tradition, this time to explain to the court that the word "Annex" after 
the factor's name at the entrance told all and sundry that the goods 
stored on the premises belonged to the factor-but for once the court 
was not impressed. That is, not favorably, for in the view of Holt, J.,62 
this was all merely one more of "the innumerable schemes by which 
merchants have attempted to create liens on their goods" with "the idea 
of giving notice enough to satisfy the law and not enough to inform the 
'UNIFORM SALES ACT ? 19(1). 
' See Baker et al. v. New York National Exchange Bank, 100 N.Y. 31, 2 
N.E. 452 (1885). 
? See 131 Fed. 313, 320 (S. D. N. Y. 1904). 
188 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911). 
62 One is reminded of the attitude of Lord Holt, some two centuries earlier, 
when confronted with the argument that bank notes should be deemed taken in 
absolute, not conditional, payment. "But then I am of opinion, and always was 
(notwithstanding the noise and cry, that it is the use of Lombard-street, as if the 
contrary opinion would blow up Lombard-street) that the acceptance of such a 
note is not actual payment." Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928, 929 (C. P. 1702). 
Lord Holt lost out eventually in his important contests with Lombard-Street ;- 
whether rightly or not depends on the viewpoint. 
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creditors."S63 In fact it did not even satisfy the law, nor did the court 
see any reason to "be astute to discover some equitable lien which the 
parties did not undertake to create."64 It was not until 1920, in Boise 
v. Talcott,65 after various attempts to perfect a common law pledge had 
failed,66 that a cumbersome possession by the factor did satisfy the 
court. 
The Omtmen case, however, was useful to the factor on one point; 
it at least recognized that under some circumstances an "assignment" 
of accounts receivable would stand up in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
That is, the court held that, under the contract before it, those accounts 
where advances had been made upon goods about to be sold should pass 
to the factor, the assignment being complete when the purchaser re- 
ceived notice by the invoice. There was no consideration of whether 
an assignment of future book accounts would be valid or not.67 And, 
of course, there was no suggestion that the factor would have a general 
lien on any assigned account.68 Some progress had been made, how- 
ever, toward repairing the wreckage left by the Ryttenberg case. 
Several years were occupied with this litigation, the Ommen case 
not being finally decided until 1911. Meanwhile, in 1910, the New 
York legislature had passed a bill69 providing simply that liens upon 
merchandise or the proceeds thereof, when created by agreement for 
the purpose of securing advances made or to be made, should not be 
void, provided only the name of the lienor and his designation as factor 
or otherwise should be posted at the entrance of the place where the 
merchandise was stored. Here was direct legislative condemnation of 
the Ryttenberg decision, but the then Governor of New York, Charles 
E. Hughes, vetoed the bill for the reason that "it would, among the less 
scrupulous, facilitate secret liens and fraudulent transactions." He 
suggested, however, that "Where it may be deemed sound policy to 
permit a lien by statute in the absence of actual possession, notice of the 
e See 188 Fed. 401, 404 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911). 
"Id., at 405. 
5 264 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). 
' The most spectacular of these attempts came to grief in Security Ware- 
housing Co. v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415 (1907), although it had long before been held, 
and presumably still is true, that a sufficient possession of a borrower's goods may 
be obtained-even while they are on his premises-to satisfy common law pledge 
requirements. Sumner v. Hamlet, 29 Mass. 76 (1831). 
" For citation and discussion of the early New York cases, see Stone, The 
"Equtable Mortgage" in New York (1920) 20 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 518, 531, 
indicating that an unrecorded mortgage of future book accounts is valid and en- 
forceable against creditors. For a Massachusetts holding to the contrary, see 
Taylor v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43 (1917), and see Clanton 
Bank v. Robinson, 195 Ala. 194, 70 So. 270 (1915). 
" In fact rather to the contrary! 
'Assembly Bill No. 2261. 
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lien should be required by filing in a public office of suitable and adequate 
information with respect to the lien and the persons, property and places 
which it concerns."70 
In 1911, Assemblyman Alfred E. Smith re-introduced the bill. It 
had been amended to require filing of a notice setting out briefly the 
name and place of business of the lienor, the name of the person creat- 
ing the lien, his interest in and the general character of the merchandise 
and the time for which the agreement was to run. In reference to this 
provision Mr. Smith said: "The danger to which the Governor referred 
was, the legislation might facilitate secret loans. That was entirely 
removed by the present bill. Nothing could be more public or less 
secret than the filing of the notice in the office where public records 
are kept." 
Actually nothing could be more simpler than the filing provided 
for. It was not necessary to describe by marks and numbers any par- 
ticular merchandise, a broad designation such as "silk," "woolens" or 
what not being sufficient. There was no requirement that the amount 
of the lienor's interest should be given. And, when once filed, on pay- 
ment of a fee of one dollar,7' the notice continued effective for the 
period of the agreement. In the course of the debate on the bill Mr. 
Hinman (later Mr. Justice Hinman) objected to the lack of any re- 
quirement of "specific description," for the bill as drawn would readily 
permit a shifting of goods to or from the designated premises in fraud 
of creditors. Mr. Smith answered: "All I can say to the gentleman 
from Albany is that it ain't possible to make men honest by legislation 
(laughter). A good many know that if a dishonest man wants to take 
advantage of our statutes, that we have not many laws on the statute 
books that you cannot beat." The bill became ? 45 of the Personal Prop- 
erty Law. 
Thus were repulsed the forces of righteousness led by Holt, J.; 
you can't make men honest by legislation, not even by judicial legis- 
lation, said the voice of the people. And the factor had gained some- 
thing in the nature of a "floating charge"72 on a stock of "merchandise 
'?The legislative history of this bill, including Governor Hughes' veto mem- 
orandum of June 25, 1910, from which the above is quoted, and the debate quoted 
hereafter on introduction of the 1911 bill, is available in the brief of the appellant, 
and in the amicus curiae briefs of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation and 
Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, submitted in the case of Utica Trust 
Co. v. Decker, 244 N. Y. 340, 155 N. E. 665 (1927). 
nThe filing fees under ? 45, N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW are those pro- 
vided for chattel mortgages under ? 234 of the N. Y. LIEN LAW; twenty-five cents 
and six cents' for a receipt. In NEW YORK CITY (COUNTY LAW) ? 177(2) the fee 
is one dollar and twenty-five cents for an "instrument affecting chattels" and 
twenty-five cents for a receipt. 
" How to provide for a "floating charge" has long given trouble although the 
desirability of such machinery has been widely recognized. See Stone, supra note 
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and the proceeds thereof,"-quite regardless of whether he had posses- 
sion. This was progress. He could now readily agree that goods are 
not "consigned," that is delivered, merely because the borrower says 
they are consigned, for it was no longer of any importance to find a 
delivery. And it was to be said in respect to Justice Hinman's objec- 
tion, that the lien as provided by the statute did not necessarily and of 
itself cover all goods which might happen to be at the posted premises; 
the practice was for the borrower to "consign" particular goods, that 
is, to invoice and thus identify the specific goods covered by the lien 
agreement. So much the factor would insist upon before making ad- 
vances. But the point was otherwise well taken for, in the exclusive 
factoring set-up,73 the general factoring agreement to which each trans- 
action went back for support was usually drawn as an immediate "con- 
signment" or "pledge" of all goods, evidently of whatever kind or de- 
scription, which the borrower had or might acquire.74 The subsequent 
invoicing to the factor was thus but further assurance and not essential 
to the factor's lien,75 at least in theory. 
Two things of importance had been accomplished, however: first, 
the word "Annex" was to be translated so that anyone could tell what 
it meant when posted, without the aid of expert testimony and second, a 
notice, however brief, must be filed as a public record. What had oc- 
curred was a clash between two different ways of doing. For more 
than a generation the banker's trust receipt security, built on a fiction of 
title, had been valid without recording of any kind, notwithstanding 
the goods were given into the hands of the importer.76 And, of course, 
67, at 527-529. In some states a mortgage on a shifting stock of goods may be 
recorded and is valid against creditors, provided the mortgagor does not have 
complete "dominion" over the proceeds. See Tooze, Oregon Law Relating to 
Mortgages upon Fluctuating Stocks of Merchandise (1926) 5 ORE. L. REv. 249 
(1926); Statute Law (1934) 9 Wis. L. REV. 407. In New York such a mort- 
gage, if not defeated by non-compliance with Lien Law ? 230a, the bulk transfer 
provision, may be valid as to existing stock. Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 360 
(1863). As to new acquisitions, however, it is not practical since recordation is 
held invalid against creditors in the case of after acquired chattels. Rochester 
Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894). 
'73 It is a credit man's commonplace to "sell a factored account on ten days." 
74A typical clause follows: "We shall at all times have exclusive possession 
and control of merchandise consigned to us as provided herein and as security for 
our advances and for any and all your indebtedness to us, we shall at all time.' 
have a continuing general lien on all of your merchandise, whether the same may be 
on our premises, at dyer's, processors, finishers, warehouses, in transit or elsewhere." 
Except for the possibility that the clause "all of your merchandise" might be con- 
strued to relate only to consigned goods, this would seem to provide for a general 
floating charge. 
" See Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68 F. (2d) 864, 865 
(C.C.A. 2d, 1934). 
7 Farmers & Mechanics Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878); In re 
James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). See generally, the valuable com- 
parative study of this and other security devices available to creditors, Hanna, 
Trust Receipts (1934) 19 CALIF. L. REV. 257. 
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the consignment arrangement, whereby the consignor retained his in- 
terest in goods in the hands of his agent, had always successfully belied 
possession as an index of ownership-and without recording.77 Al- 
ways, that is, except as the Factors Act78 had served to protect the par- 
ticular creditors who had actually relied on the factor's possession.79 To 
a New York merchant, therefore, familiar with these matters80 and 
long accustomed to rely on the financial statement as a credit index, 
a suggestion that he should estimate a man's actual worth by the goods 
he had on hand would have been nothing short of preposterous. 
So much for banker, merchant and manufacturer,-but the little 
fellow, unversed in the wiles of the mercantile world, is perhaps still 
entitled to consideration. Of course, even he may not be so naive as 
to believe everything he sees; there must be someone to make mistakes 
so that others may prosper according to their deserts. Laying gross 
deception to one side-that is "fraud"-which has been frowned upon 
ever since Twynes case8' at least, a moderate amount of sharp dealing, 
has always been part and parcel of a competitive system.82 But in the 
sales field at least the rewards for sharp corner cutting per se have 
been decreasing-as witness the decline in recent years of that good old 
doctrine for the promotion of trade, caveat em ptor.83 No doubt Lord 
Hardwick had the long range interests of trade in mind when he said 
it would be better "to allow the public notorious transaction than that 
which is secret."84 For, even the larger fellows-or their financial 
agencies-must be given some means of learning facts; criminal pros- 
ecutions85 for false statements are often too much like locking the barn 
after the horse is stolen. 
77Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U. S. 522 (1913). In several south- 
ern states, however, provision is made requiring the consignor to post a sign, 
similar to that required by ? 45 of the N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, in order to 
preserve his interest as against creditors. See Virginia Traders Act, Va. Code 
(1930) ? 5224 and Edmunds v. Hobbie Piano Co., 97 Va. 588, 34 S. E. 472 (1899). 
The later cases are collected in STEFFEN, CASES ON AGENCY (1933) 561n. 
78N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1915) ? 43. 
79The contrast here is between general unsecured creditors who often will not 
have relied on the debtor's possession and those relying on the very goods accepted 
as security. As for buyers, both were reasonably protected, since both trust re- 
ceipt and consignment arrangements usually, though not always, contemplated sale. 
Sales in bulk were excluded in so far as affected by the Bulk Sales Act. See 
N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW ? 44 (1935). Under the UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS AcT, 
? 9, the purchaser is admirably protected. See HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1933) 263, 264. 80 Not to mention the various forms of recorded mortgage and conditional sales 
agreements which make reliance on mere possession almost wholly illusory. See 
generally Hanna, Extension of Public Recordation (1931) 31 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 
616. 
813 Co. Rep. 80L (Star Chamber, 1601). 
'2See RADIN, THE LAWFUL PURSUIT OF GAIN (1931). 
' Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133. 
8 See supra note 17. 
85Of course such sanctions no doubt have some deterrent value. They are 
widely used: Criminal Code ? 215, (1909) 18 U. S. C. A. ? 338 (1927) (Using mails 
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The compromise hammered out in this fashion by the legislature 
was a good one. The notice requirements were neither unduly cumber- 
some-Dean Stone to the contrary notwithstanding86 -nor did they fail 
to give at least a hint of the borrower's actual state of affairs, that is, 
at least to the larger creditor. It is apparent, moreover, that Taney, 
C. J., was not so far out of line last century, in finding a "property" 
interest in the factor who had made advances.87 A re-reading of the 
cases so deciding discloses that always the goods were in the hands of 
a third person-carrier, warehouseman or processor-and never in 
those of the borrower.88 And, in spite of the needless occupation with 
the question whether "the law" dubbed the bailee agent for the lender 
or agent for the buyer, the needs of trade usually furnished the answer. 
Indeed, the unrecorded security title now vested in the holder of a 
negotiable seller's order bill of lading is justified for no other reason.89 
It was against this background that Professor Llewellyn drafted the 
Uniform Trust Receipts Act and shortened the banker's security posi- 
tion, without filing, to a period of 30 days.90 So far have the objections 
of Holt, J., carried. 
to promote fraud is a crime) ; Bettman v. United States, 224 Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 6th, 
1915), cert. denied, 239 U. S. 642 (1915) (Using the mails to get credit upon a 
false financial statement is within this section); N. Y. PENAL LAW (1921) ? 1293b 
(Misdemeanor to issue a false financial statement). 
8' See Stone, supra note 67, at 533. In England the exception to the general 
requirement of recordation provided for by the BILL OF SALES ACT (1878) ? 4 and 
COMPANIES ACT (1929) ? 79, 2 c, that is, of documents arising in the "usual course 
of trade or calling," takes care of the commercial lender's problem. Under this 
exception as well as on the usual title rationale the holder of an unrecorded 
"Letter of Trust" has been held to prevail over the trustee in bankruptcy of the 
signer. In re David Allester, Ltd. [1922] 2 Ch. 211. So also "letters of lien" 
given a bank lending on goods at a processors and in preparation for shipment need 
not be recorded because customary. In re Hamilton Young & Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 
772. The reliance here is therefore purely on the general understanding of the 
business community as to how such matters are handled. 
87 See supra note 47. 
'A typical case with an extremely modern ring is that of Nesmith v. The 
Dyeing, Bleaching and Calendering Co., 1 Curtis 130 (U. S. C. C. A. 1852). It 
was held that the factor had a security "title" to 500 pieces of cloth in the hands 
of a processor to be colored as cambric. It is interesting to note the importance 
attached in the comparable sales situation-specific goods in possession of a third 
party-to a mere notice to the depository as respects the rights of third persons. 
See UNIFORM SALES ACT ?? 34, 43(3). 
'UNIFORM SALES ACT ? 20(2). As to the nature of this "property" interest 
where the bill of lading is in the hands of a discounting bank, see Note (1926) 26 
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 63. 
9 The act as finally approved appears in (1933) HANDBOOK OF THE COMMIS- 
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1933) 256. It was adopted in New York, 
effective July 1, 1934, as ?? 50-58b of the Personal Property Law. See Bogert, 
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (1935) 3 U. OF CH. L. REV. 26. For several years 
the act was hung up in committee on the question of whether full recording as de- 
manded by agricultural states, or none at all in accordance with the holdings of the 
courts of the commercial eastern-seaboard states, should be favored. The com- 
promise finally adopted was a variation of the inexpensive filing under ? 45, with 
but a single central filing (with the Department of State) and no posting required. 
N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW ? 58e(3). 
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But even so the factor was not entirely satisfied with his handi- 
work, or that of his lawyers; a hole had developed with respect to 
returned merchandise. Having foreseen this eventuality, particularly 
where a distressed mill might falsify invoices or ship out inferior 
goods in order to procure much needed but ill deserved credit, it had 
long been practice to stipulate in the factoring agreement that such 
merchandise should be held "in trust" for the factor on its return.91 So 
far so good. But what happened to the factor's interest in the mean- 
time? Obviously he had not retained possession and equally clearly 
he could not go to the purchaser's place of business and hang up a 
factor sign to satisfy the statute. When, in 1913, the case first came 
up in New York the Federal court went back to early concepts-paying 
no attention to the 1911 statute-and found that as the factor had 
bought the account receivable he took the returned merchandise.92 Just 
as in Mansfield's day the lien on the goods carried with it a lien on the 
price,93 so here a lien on-or ownership of-the receivable carried an 
interest in the goods. 
But in the case of In re Shulman,94 a bankruptcy proceeding com- 
ing up in Pennsylvania during the same year, the court took a much 
different view of the matter. With more assurance than perhaps others 
would feel in the same situation,95 it ruled that the "property" in the 
goods-raincoats- had passed to the buyer upon shipment. All that 
the lender had acquired was a pledgee's interest-by assignment-in 
the receivable. Accordingly when the goods were returned to the bank- 
rupt the effect of the "in trust" provision was either to attempt a new 
pledge, bad for lack of delivery, or a mortgage, bad for lack of record- 
ing, for the title to the raincoats had revested in the shipper. On this 
reasoning, even had the advance been made upon the security of the 
goods also, the lien would probably have vanished as the title went to 
'A typical provision now in use follows: "If any merchandise, from the sale 
of which an account is created, shall be returned by or recovered from purchasers, 
you shall forthwith pay us the amount of such account, either in cash or by the 
creation of new accounts hereunder, and until such repayment, the merchandise so 
returned shall be our property." 
'In re Livingston & Turk, 205 Fed. 364, 366 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913). "The ac- 
counts being no longer available security, it was clearly the intention of the bank- 
rupts to substitute the returned goods. . . . Its purpose was not to create a lien 
but to give the bankers title to the goods. Such an agreement can be and ought to 
be enforced in equity." But Lacombe, C. J., dissented because at the time when 
the purported assignment operated "the bankrupts had no title to convey." 
9 See supra note 19. 
"206 Fed. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1913). 
95See L. Hand, J. dissenting, in the case of In re Lake's Laundry, Inc. 79 
F.(2d) 326, 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), where he says, " 'title' is a formal word for a 
purely conceptual notion; I do not know what it means and I question whether 
anybody does, except perhaps legal historians." 
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the buyer, except as a right of stoppage in transitu96 may have been 
accorded the lender while the goods were in the carrier's hands. And on 
return, with revesting of the title in the borrower, the lender would 
have again been without security. Somewhat legalistic perhaps, but, at 
all events it was this precedent which Swan, J., chose to follow in the 
case of In re Bernard and Katz,97 which arose in 1930. To the lenders' 
argument that he had title to the goods the court said: "We cannot 
comprehend what such an assertion means."98 
While the lender had thus lost $275, the proceeds of some 45 
dresses, the disquieting feature of the opinion was Judge Swan's blunt 
announcement, that Section 45 of the Personal Property Law had 
"nothing to do with the case."99 For, quite obviously, the statement 
was entirely true. The trouble was that the framers of the 1911 act 
had had their noses buried so deeply in the Ryttenberg case that they 
had not bothered to see what was even then happening to the factor's 
business. Holt, J., had said that the factor's purported lien on goods in 
his client's hands, and their proceeds, was void, and they had sought, 
one suspects with some feeling, to have the legislature answer categori- 
cally that it was not void. This the legislature did, with qualifications. 
But the "factor" had meanwhile commenced loaning on receivables to 
the exclusion of the loan upon goods and by 1930 the factor's merchan- 
dise loans had become a relatively small part of his business.100 The 
act, seemingly, had come to have little bearing on the factor's affairs. 
In this state of things the case of Goldstein v. Rusch'0l came on for 
decision. Here the borrower, somewhat more considerate than the 
borrower in the Bernard and Katz litigation, had told the factor of his 
impending difficulties on the day before the bankruptcy petition was 
filed. Without any, unnecessary delay, therefore, the factor sent a 
truck around and gathered in all "wearing apparel" the bankrupt had on 
hand which might have been returned merchandise. Of course the 
factor knew that his action might, as a voidable preference,102 be re- 
'The factor contracts for this privilege and there is no reason apparent why 
his use of it should not be sanctioned, even though he may now be regarded as 
merely a statutory factor. See the early case of Snee v. Prescot, 1 Atkins 245 
(Ch. 1743). 
w 38 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). 
Id., at 44. 
Ibid. Speaking further of ? 45 the court said: "It contemplates the mak- 
ing of a loan on the security of merchandise of which the borrower will retain 
possession. It does not apply to an assignment of accounts as security." 
' Achelis, The Expansion of Commercial Factoring, THE BURROUGHS CLEAR- 
ING HOUSE (July, 1935) 14. "The factor is concerned as a rule only with a manu- 
facturer's accounts receivable, although occasionally he does lend against inven- 
tories to tide a manufacturer over a seasonal peak." PROSPECTUS, supra note 8, at 4. 
?l56 F.(2d) 10 (C. C.A. 2d, 1932). 
"'iAt least the master and the court below, Patterson, J., thought so. See the 
opinion in 54 F.(2d) 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1930). 
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garded as not less invalid than undignified. M\oreover, under the doc- 
trine of Benedict v. Ratner'03 there was grave danger that, even if his 
security were otherwise unexceptionable, it might be avoided since the 
borrower had been allowed a considerable dominion over the goods 
when returned.'04 And seemingly the In re Bernard & Katz decision 
had denied him either a pledge or a mortgagee interest anyway. But 
in the opinion of Manton, J., this case was different, the returned goods 
"in trust" provision in the factoring agreement constituted a pledge, 
and, the possession being taken before bankruptcy, it related back to the 
date of the agreement and validated the transaction. The factor had 
been saved again! 
The Goldstein case was decided in the old tradition, that is, for 
the supposed good of trade rather than for an abstract equality. 
"Whether enough has been done to give a right of any kind in certain 
property is a question of more or less," said Holmes, J., in Sexton v. 
Kessler.105 The equitable lien was devised for the very purpose of 
sustaining the business man's informal security transaction, when en- 
tered into in good faith-particularly where no third person's expecta- 
tions would be disappointed by so doing.106 Indeed, this was the 
accepted means in some states of providing security to the factor for 
advances against goods still in the hands of the Mnill.107 And so recently 
as 1922 the Rhode Island court granted the factor an equitable lien on 
goods in the possession of a receiver.108 But at least since the banker's 
lien on day loans to brokers against securities to be purchased was held 
invalid,109 the remedy has been too uncertain to be useful; it is hard 
1 268 U. S. 353 (1925). 1 Judge Mack's opinion in Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co. 38 F. (2d) 45 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930) presents the situation nicely where the borrower has such 
"dominion" as is "fraudulent" as to his creditors. 
105225 U. S. 90, at 98 (1912). 1 As pointed out by Coxe, J. in Livingston v. Turk, 205 Fed. 364, 366 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1913), goods returned to the bankrupt by a purchaser are in the nature of a 
windfall to the general creditors. 
'1 Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154 N. C. 1, 69 S. E. 743 (1910) ; James Free- 
man Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S. C. 558, 70 S. E. 802 (1911). 
108 Contrexville Mfg. Co. v. Oswegatchie Textile Co., 117 Atl. 654, 655 (R. I., 
1922). "As the Textile Company intended to give security to the Daval Company 
upon said materials, products, and accounts, the equitable maxim 'Equity regards as 
done that which ought to be done,' applies." 
9 The legal history of this controversy is ablv set forth by Swan, J. in Irving 
Trust Co. v. Bank of America National Ass'n, 68 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). 
The effect of the 1910 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act ? 47 a (2) 36 SrAT. 840 
(1910) 11 U. S. C. A. ? 75 a (2) (1926), is to weaken the position of the holder of 
an equitable lien, for while the lien may be good against a receiver who "stands in 
the shoes" of the insolvent company, the trustee in bankruptcy has the position of a judgment creditor. Since ? 77B provides a corporate reorganization on the lines of 
eqtuity receivership, the cases permitting an equitable lien holder to maintain his 
security, notes 107, 108 sutpra, may, however, become useful law even in a bank- 
ruptcy court. But cf. H. K. Porter v. Boyd, 171 Fed. 305, 313 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919) 
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to do business when, to any considerable extent, your rights depend on 
questions of more or less."10 
The plot was obviously become too thick for comfort. In 1931, 
therefore, the legislature again was called upon for assistance and the 
act of 1911 was amended. The old provision had read that "liens upon 
merchandise or the proceeds thereof" shall not be void by reason of 
want of possession, that is, upon filing the notice and posting the sign 
provided for. But some courts had begun to doubt whether the new 
factor was really a factor at all, hinting rather openly that he was really 
a banker,"11 a wolf in sheep's clothing so to speak. The thought oc- 
curred, what if some literal-minded court should next decide, since the 
lender was not really a factor at all, that the basis for his lien had dis- 
appeared? To prevent any such woeful miscarriage of justice, "factor" 
was therefore defined as any consignee or pledgee who advances money 
on goods consigned or pledged to him, whether or not he is employed to 
sell them."2 And it was then provided, affirmatively, that such a factor 
has "a continuing general lien" upon all goods consigned to him- 
whether or not in his possession-on any accounts receivable or other 
proceeds resulting from a disposal of the goods. That is, where he has 
an agreement to such effect. 
Surely the factor had now earned a "breathing spell," not that he 
appears ever to have let his legal pitfalls interfere particularly with his 
business. At all events, with the insolvency of Nathan & Cohen, 
Inc.,"13 a concern operating in the cotton converting business, his legal 
hopes were largely justified. Swan, J. had no difficulty in holding that 
goods in the bankrupt's hands were subject to the factor's lien under 
which is typical of a contrary line of authority. "In case of a receivership for an 
insolvent corporation, procured at the instance of general creditors on the ground 
of insolvency, we are unable to perceive why a secret lien unenforceable at law 
should not be defeated by the seizure of the property 'by the hand of the court' as 
effectually as by the making of an attachment or levying an execution by a sheriff." 
110 "I desire nothing so much, as that all questions of mercantile law should be 
fully settled and ascertained; and it is of much more consequence that they should 
be so, than which way the decision is" per Mansfield, J., in Buller v. Harrison, 2 
Cowp. 565, 567 (K. B. 1777). But cf. Frank, Are Judges Hmnan? (1931) 80 U. of 
PA. L. REv. 17, 33. "The truth is that the talk about the mechanical operation of 
rules in property, or commercial, or other cases is not at all a description of what 
really happens in courts in contested cases." 
ill See Shoyer v. Wright-Ginsberg Co., 240 N. Y. 223, 231, 148 N. E. 328, 330 
(1925); Lemnos Broad Silk Works, Inc. v. Spiegelberg, 127 Misc. 855, 857, 217 
N. Y. Supp. 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., 1926). For an early doubt in the matter, 
see Talcott v. Chew, 27 Fed. 273 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1885). 
112N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW ? 45 as amended by L. 1931, c. 766: "The terms 
'factor' and 'factors' wherever used in this section include any consignee or con- 
signees, pledgee or pledgees who advance money on goods consigned to and/or 
pledged with them, whether or not such consignees or pledgees are employed to 
sell such goods and their successors in interest." 
113 Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68 F.(2d) 864 (C. C. A. 2d, 
1934). 
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Section 45, the necessary sign having been posted and notice filed.1"4 
Goods at the dyers, as well as finished goods which the factor had con- 
signed to an agent for sale, were both held to be subject to the ancient 
common law lien, there being no possession in the borrower in such 
case "giving him a false credit."1"5 Even the Goldstein v. Rusch"I6 
case was approved, by way of dicta, for there "the returned goods stood 
in the place of the validly assigned account, hence no preference. 
."117 It was only the goods purchased after known bankruptcy, and 
on which no new advance had been made, that were denied to the factor, 
but that, at least, was a result, more or less to be expected."18 
Evidently all was at last well with the factor's merchandise lien. 
But, if the factor thought so, he reckoned without Hubbs, J. in the case 
of Irz'ing Trust Co. v. Lindner & Bro. Inc.,119 decided in April, 1934. 
The case was simple. It seems the factor had taken actual possession 
of the merchandise in question, within four months previous to his 
client's bankruptcy, it is true, but all pursuant to the general factoring 
agreement. He claimed a lien upon it according to the ancient law. 
Still, he had not posted the statutory sign nor filed a notice, and, though 
114 In fact the factor here had also assumed such possession of the borrower's 
goods, by lease, by retention of the keys to the premises and by having employees 
at work there daily, that the result would have been the same at common law. See 
Boise v. Talcott, 264 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) and compare In re Merz, 37 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (where the possession of the factor was not "ostensible" 
enough and he had failed to file under ? 45) and In re H. M. Kouri Corp., 66 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (despite keys and custodian the lien is statutory and 
not possessory and may therefore be adjudicated by summary process in the bank- 
ruptcy court). 
See 68 F. (2d) 864, 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). 
118 56 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), supra note 101. 
117 See 68 F.(2d) 864, 868 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); also compare note 92. This way 
of stating the thing throws great doubt on the Bernard and Katz decision since it 
constitutes a return to the theory approved by Learned Hand, J. in the case of 
In re Worth Lighting and Fixture Co., 292 Fed. 769, 772 (S. D. N. Y. 1923). It 
was there said: "The return of the goods is a tender by the consignee of goods, in- 
stead of money, in payment of his debt." 
118 A transfer of additional security for preexisting advances, after knowledge of 
insolvency, could at best be justified against the charge of preference as a perfection 
of an existing equitable lien. But since this property was not in existence at the 
time of the contract, that is prior to the four months' period, there were no "identi- 
fied" goods upon which the lien could attach as there were in Sexton v. Kessler, 
225 U. S. 90 (1912), supra note 105 and Goldstein v. Rusch 56 F.(2d) 10 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1932) supra note 100. See Burrowes v. Nimocks, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 4th, 
1929), and Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem. (1930) 
8 N. C. L. REV. 388. Of course it might have been argued that it would be "benefi- 
cial for trade" to have a factor continue to do business with a client whom he al- 
ready knows to be insolvent. Lord Mansfield was very clear that the factor should 
be so encouraged. Foxcroft v. Devonshire, 2 Burr. 931 (K. B. 1760). Such a result 
might well be achieved, moreover, by giving the factor a lien upon all goods con- 
signed or accounts transferred to him in ordinary course of business before actual 
bankruptcy, by analogy to the banker's lien-or right of "set-off"-in such case 
upon the deposit account. New York County Bank v. Massey, 192 U. 5. 138 (1904). 
119264 N. Y. 165, 190 N. E. 332 (193-4). 
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that would have been immaterial under the 1911 provision,'20 the great 
question in the cause was whether he should not now be required to 
do so in view of the 1931 amendment to Section 45. Here was a very 
"nice" question indeed, but surely one so only in a Pickwickian sense, 
for had not the legislature "intended" to relieve the factor rather than 
to make his life even more burdensome than before. However, how 
was one to know what the legislature intended? 
The court's reasoning was to the point, even if not wholly persuasive. 
First, it was clear that Lindner & Bro., Inc. were not really factors, that 
is "ordinary" factors. They were mere statutory factors or, worse 
still, mere "commercial bankers." They could have no common-law 
factors' lien rights-apart from statute-because such rights arise only 
from "the duty and obligation resting upon the 'ordinary factor' in- 
trusted with the possession of goods and charged with the duty of 
selling them.'12' Obviously no commercial banker who disdained sell- 
ing could qualify. As for statutory rights, the case was even clearer, 
for the 1931 amendment, possibly in an excess of legislative zeal to 
help the factor, had made the section apply to all goods, "whether in his 
possession or not." This meant simply that the commercial factor- 
even when in possession of goods-must file the statutory notice and, 
presumably, post a sign,122 or his lien was void. Such was-or be- 
came-the legislative intent. 
To a disinterested observer the situation now has its amusing 
features. Obviously those acting in the factor's behalf over-reached 
themselves by the 1931 amendment. Nor was it ever very clear how 
they expected it to cure the returned goods difficulty presented by In re 
Bernard and Katz123 -unless the provision for a "continuing general 
lien" was to make the factor's interest survive.124 But, on the other 
hand, Hubbs, J. seems to have fallen into a logical error in deciding 
that because the new factor is not like the old-in that he does no 
selling-it follows that he has no lien.125 And the "cogent" reason 
' See 264 N. Y. at 172, 190 N. E., at 335. 
' See 264 N. Y. at 174, 190 N. E., at 336. 
" This would evidently require posting at the factor's own place of business, 
since the sign must be posted where the goods are stored. 
123 38 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), supra note 97. 
What the word "continuing" was intended to mean is not clear. It may have 
been intended to assure a prospective action to the lien as in the case of a con- 
tinuing guaranty. See Henry McShane Co. v. Padian, 142 N. Y. 207, 36 N. E. 880 
(1894). Or, more likely, to assure the continuance of the security as the goods 
are moved from point to point. See McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. 467 (N. Y. 
1841). 
125 Compare the similar reasoning of the court with respect to a variation from 
the "regular" C. I. F. contract. Cundill v. A. W. Millhauser Corporation, 257 
N. Y. 416, 178 N. E. 680 (1931). 
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found in the legislative mind,126 that the amendment was to prevent 
evasion of the bankruptcy act as approved in Goldstein v. Rusch'27 on 
the doctrine of relation back, would be hard to support by reference to 
legislative records. Rather, the robust common sense of Swan, J. in 
sanctioning a possessory lien-regardless of how the new factor should 
be classified-so long as no "false credit" had been given the bor- 
rower,128 commends itself as sound. For surely the legislature had no 
intention of upsetting the age old possessory lien, merely to legislate 
concerning the relatively infrequent case where the relation back doc- 
trine has application-even if the court's interpretation did permit it 
to correct a curious inconsistency in its own holdings.129 
At all events "the people" were not pleased with the court's inter- 
pretation, for in 1935 the section was again amended. It now provides 
specifically that a factor has a "continuing general lien"-where he has 
contracted for it-upon any goods in his possession or in the possession 
of "any third party" for his "account," all without filing or posting.130 
That the common law possessory lien is valid should now at least be 
clear. But whether the court will retreat from its position condemning 
the "relation back" doctrine is not at all clear. The legislature said 
something further to the effect that the section should not be construed 
as affecting "any rights at common law" but what that means, no one 
knows.'13 In 1931 it had said that the section should be construed 
"liberally" to secure "the beneficial interests and purposes thereof." But 
what is "beneficial" is a matter of some doubt. 
So ends this chronicle of the factor's adventures before the courts- 
and the legislatures. Though at times discouraged still, withal, he has 
had his successes. What of the future? It will be assumed that this 
depends on who the new factor really is, or rather, on what contribu- 
tion he can be said to make to the economic life of the time. If one 
thing more than any other is clear up to this point, it is that the courts 
through the years have given him powerful support in the attainment of 
l2 264 N. Y. 165, 190 N. E. 332 (1934), supra note 119. 
12756 F.(2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), supra note 101. 
128 See Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68 F. (2d) 864, 866 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934), supra note 113. 
129 The inconsistency is between the holdings with respect to chattel mortgages 
and pledges. In the case of the former, possession taken within four months of 
after acquired goods does not relate back to the original contract as a perfection of 
a prior existing equitable lien. See the Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N. Y. 
267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907) line of authority. In the pledge case "relation back" is 
permitted. Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873) and see Sexton v. Kessler, 225 
U. S. 90 (1912), supra note 105. 130 Laws 1935, c. 690. 
131 The implication is possible that the legislature meant to reestablish the right 
to perfect the lien of an equitable pledgee by possession taken even during the criti- 
cal 4 month period, which had been established without its assistance See suspra 
note 129. 
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his purposes. But it is equally clear that in the last quarter century 
there has been doubt; the old confident singleness of purpose, the fur- 
ther "promotion of trade," has been lacking at times. Or possibly the 
doubt has been whether the present factor contributes substantially to 
that end. Though he appears to show a profit, there has been a feeling 
that profit, like virtue, is its own reward-and that the courts need no 
longer be unduly solicitous of his affairs. 
It is not possible in the remaining pages even to attempt to white- 
wash the new factor's economic life; besides, if that is desirable, it can be 
much better done by an economist.'32 It is evident, however, that he 
has been retiring to an ever safer position; no longer is he at the out- 
posts selling the nation's goods. Where once the textile factor had a 
little office in the corner of a warehouse stacked with merchandise he 
now occupies whole floors with no goods in sight.'33 But even in the 
beginning selling was not the factor's sole, or necessarily his most im- 
portant, function. The lien was given according to Chambre, J. "to 
encourage factors to advance money, "134 not primarily to sell goods. 
Or, one might say equally, to encourage the factor to guarantee the 
purchaser's account, for the del credere factor seems always to have 
had a lien on goods and the resulting receivable.135 Both these services 
the modern "factor" performs. In addition, for his own protection and 
incidentally for that of his client, he supplies a highly skilled credit 
service.'36 And, encouraged therein by Benedict v. Ratner, he has 
further kept a close hand on collections, another important service to 
his client.137 
Whether a concern doing such things is properly called a factor is 
of course now beside the point. It is evident that as his interest has 
come to center in the receivable-rather than in the merchandise-his 
service approaches more closely that of the banker's. But when it has 
been suggested, once or twice, that he is in fact a banker-and should 
be regulated138 or taxed139 as such-there has been serious objection. 
132 Compare SELIGMAN; THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALLMENT SFLLING (1927). 1 See supra note 100. 
134Supra note 22. 
135See supra note 19 and see R. S. T. Chorley, Del Credere (1929) 45 L. Q. 
REV. 221. 
136 One of the factor's chief "selling points" in getting new clients is that for a 
small commission he assumes all the burdens of credits and collections. 
137 See supra note 103. Because the accounts are payable directly to the factor 
there can be no question of allowing his client too much "dominion" over the pro- 
ceeds. 
" That is, comply with banking law. See In re Worth Lighting & Fixture 
Co., 292 Fed. 769, 773 (S. D. N. Y. 1923), supra note 117, where Hand, J. said of 
the factor that he "is doing a business precisely like a pawnbroker, except that the 
pawns are not chattels." At all events, that the factor was not "discounting bills, 
notes or other evidences of debt" as a bank was thought to be clear. 
139 People ex rel. James Talcott, Inc. v. Goldfogle, 242 N. Y. 544, 152 N. E. 
420 (1926). 
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For this purpose, at least, the "factor does something more than merely 
loan money."140 And, conversely, it has been pointed out that banks 
never make advances on goods or the receivables resulting from their 
sale and that they do not guarantee accounts nor do they have any facili- 
ties for storing goods.'4' Of course to anyone acquainted with present 
day banking this is essentially incorrect, as is the suggestion that the 
modern factor is primarily concerned with goods. 
But it is true that the banker way of doing these things is different. 
He has different machinery and, it may be said, a different psy- 
chology.'42 He does not advertise Sales for Sale,'43 but on the contrary, 
the lowly borrower must approach him hat in hand, that is until 
recently. But he positively does make loans against goods, whether in 
storage or transit, if they are represented by a negotiable document. He 
positively buys or makes advances on receivables144 -but they must be in 
negotiable form. Indeed, in many cases now, he makes advances against 
the same type of receivables as does the factor. And, while his efforts 
to guarantee accounts long were obstructed by the ultra zires doctrine,'45 
he now does the same thing by issuing a letter of credit undertaking 
himself to accept and pay the seller's draft. The circumstance that 
it is the buyer in the letter of credit transaction who arranges for the 
credit, while it is the seller who initiates things in the factor set-up, 
would seem to be of no especial functional significance.'46 It is the sale 
that is being financed in either event. These and other differences in 
form, however, may save the factor from regulation yet awhile as a 
banker.147 On the other hand, the underlying similarity in function 
should possibly entitle the factor to a share in the favor which the 
banker has enjoyed through the years. 
Possibly it is the finance company, the factor's neighbor on the 
left, which has caused the courts at times to look askance at the factor. 
In terms of fees, however, the line between the two is very marked. 
140Dowling, J. in the opinion in the same case in the Appellate Division, 213 
App. Div. 719, at 725; 211 N. Y. Supp. 122, at 128 (lst Dept. 1925). 
141 See the testimony of Herbert P. Howell, then an officer of Peierls, Buhler 
& Co., as summarized in the case, 213 App. Div. at 724, 211 N. Y. Supp. at 127. 
142 See RoBINSON, LAW AND LAWYERS (1935). 
Sales for Sale (Jan. 1933) 7 FORTUNE 70. 
144For a discount case taking the lien view, see Barton Seed, Feed & Imple- 
ment Co. v. Mercantile Bank, 128 Tenn. 320, 160 S. W. 848 (1913). 145 See Pan American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F. (2d) 
762 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) where the statutory basis is considered. 
140 Indeed, as the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is drawn it is entirely possible, 
though somewhat foreign to his habit of thought, for the factor to use the trust 
receipt device in releasing goods to the buyer. 
14 Nor is his business quite that of an insurance company, though his "pur- 
chase" or "guaranty" of accounts has some resemblance to credit insurance. 
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The cost of money borrowed from the wholesale148 "finance" or "dis- 
count" company averages from 15 to 20%.149 The factor on the other 
hand charges a fee of about 2% and interest at the rate of 6% for ad- 
vances actually made.150 The difference is due to differences in the 
way the two businesses are run. In the first place much of the finance 
company business is done on a non-notification151 basis, forced in part 
by the adverse business and banking attitude toward anyone who has 
to "hock his accounts."'152 The result is that, not only may a company 
not infrequently have to contest its title to the account,153 but it is f or- 
ever being faced with loss due to the Benedict v. Ratner situation.154 
But probably the real, though less tangible difference, lies in the fact 
that the factor has grown up out of a merchandise background-he still 
knows something first hand of styling, of budgeting production, of 
credit conditions and such matters-while the finance company, and to 
a lesser extent the banker,155 has been concerned almost exclusively 
with the receivable. 
' The finance company here referred to does its business by lending money on 
the security of the book accounts of manufacturers and wholesalers. It should be 
distinguished from the finance company (frequently the same one) doing a busi- 
ness in purchasing retail conditional sales contracts from dealers in automobiles, 
radios, refrigerators, furniture and the like. See Adelson, The Mechanics of the 
Instalment Credit Sale (1935) 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 218. 
149 CHAPIN, CREDIT AND COLLECrION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1929) 287. 
Besides these charges the borrower still has bad-debt and collection costs to meet. 
1"Id., at 292, says the average charge is about 1V2 to 2%. Variations in the 
size of receivables and the type of purchasers sold, lower interest rates on monev 
borrowed by the factor from the banks and competition for clients leads to varia- 
tions in this average. For a practical insight into the mechanics of the factor's 
business, the lectures on factoring given by I. Edwin Goldwasser, President of 
Bachmann, Emmerich & Co., at New York University School of Commerce (un- 
published) have proved invaluable. 
151 The debtor is not notified of the assignment but pays his bill directly to the 
borrower-assignor. See, Laucheimer, Some Problems of Modern Collateral Bank- 
ing (1926) 26 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 129. 
152Due to its high cost, see supra note 149, this form of financing is only re- 
sorted to when all other doors are closed to the borrower. That being so, whether 
cause or effect, it usually means the borrower's credit is exhausted. Factoring, 
being a regular course of business, is not such a danger signal. But compare 
Manton, J., in Boise v. Talcott, 264 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920), supra note 65. 
"This method of financing an embarrassed commercial concern in this line is com- 
mon, and the right to do so is recognized by the courts." (at p. 64.) 
153 See for example, Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 
182 (1924). 
" Typical are: Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 
1931); Manufacturers' Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F.(2d) 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 
1935); In re Lambert and Braceland Co., 29 F.(2d) 758 (E. D. Pa. 1928). "The 
outstanding result of these several legal restrictions upon the assignment of book 
accounts as collateral security is to penalize heavily the business forced to resort 
to the practice." See Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 639, 649 containing an encyclo- 
paedic treatment of the legal problems involved in "non-notification" finance com- 
pany practice. And see Glenn, Book Accounts as Collateral (1926) 26 COLUMBIA 
LAW REV. 809. 
155 CHAPIN, op. cit. supra note 149, at 290, points out that owing to his more in- 
timate connection with the business, "Much larger sums are advanced by the factor 
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Then too the factor says he "buys" the account instead of merely 
loaning against it as security.156 But so too doles the banker when he 
discounts a draft157 and the assignment of accounts to a finance com- 
pany at least reads like a present sale.158 The measure of truth in the 
factor's statement, however, lies in the extent to which recourse is re- 
served against his client. The banker takes an indorsement, the finance 
company an express contract-thus putting the ultimate financial risk 
in each case upon the client'59-but the factor agrees to take this risk 
himself.'60 A very broad difference indeed! What has happened is 
that "the del credere contract" of the factor-spelled out slowly and at 
great pain and cost by the courts-has been carefully reworded.161 The 
ancient argument whether it constitutes a guaranty of payment or of 
collection162 is gone; the factor undertakes to advance the full price of 
the receivable at maturity, whether the receivable is paid or not, and 
conversely may "charge back" the entire account at any time prior 
to the factored mill than a bank would be willing to advance on an unsecured basis, 
and the form of security which the mill can offer is not the kind of security that 
the commercial bank would be willing to accept." This is, of course, more true 
of the merchandise advance than of the accounts. 
15 The subtitle to Achelis' article cited supra note 100 is: "The purchasing of 
accounts receivable is not a new practice but a practice that has been spreading to 
new lines of business." 
157 See, for example, Weed v. Boston & Maine R. R. 124 Me. 336, 128 Atl. 696 
(1925) and for a discussion of the matter, Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper as 
"Purchases" (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 874. 
15 See Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 285 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 6th, 
1922) cert. denied 261 U. S. 621 (1922). But cf. In re Eby, 39 F.(2d) 76 (E. D. 
N. C. 1929). 
159 See Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 285 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 6th, 
1922) at 496. Compare recourse and non-recourse "purchasing" of retail condi- 
tional sales contracts as set forth in Cavers, The Consumer's Stake in. the Finance 
Company Code Controversy (1935) 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 200. 
Where the factor purchases trade acceptances instead of book accounts, a new con- 
tract in use in the fur trade provides: "All commercial paper so purchased by us 
shall be bought by us without recourse to you on said commercial paper as such, 
and shall be endorsed by you without recourse. 
10 Because he agrees to take the financial risk of the purchaser's solvency, 
control exercised by the credit department of an integrated business must be allo- 
cated to the factor. So stipulations permitting such control must be included in the 
sales contract of his client out of which the account arises. See generally: Siegel 
v. Huebshman, 187 App. Div. 548, 176 N. Y. Supp. 71 (lst Dept. 1919) ; Peierls, 
Buhler & Co., Inc. v. Newburger, 202 App. Div. 471, 195 N. Y. Supp. 142 (lst 
Dept. 1922); Havighurst, Clauses in Sales Contracts Protecting the Seller Against 
Impairment of the Buyer's Credit (1936) 20 MINN. L. REV. 367. 
101 In Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 511, 114 N. E. 846, 
847 (1916), Cardozo, J. had said that a del credere factor must first reimburse 
himself out of goods in his hands for sale. The holding in Shoyer v. Edmund 
Wright-Ginsberg Co., 240 N. Y. 223, 148 N. E. 328 (1925) is that such is not the 
case where the factor is a "commercial banker" type of factor rather than a sales 
agent. See 240 N. Y. at 233, 148 N. E. at 331. 
1 See Lewis, Brothers & Co. v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412 (1870). 
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thereto in event of a merchandise dispute.163 Only the banker in the 
commercial credit transaction assumes a greater obligation to the seller, 
since the agreement there is to pay against documents whether the 
goods conform or not.164 
More than all else, it would seem, the factor owes his existence to- 
day to the stubborn persistence of the open book account way of doing 
business. The banker's trade acceptance, though widely publicized- 
and even, by rediscount by the Federal Reserve Banks, made directly 
convertible into money-does not afford the buyer an opportunity 
to assert defenses, or sufficient leeway to "jockey" and "chisel." So 
a fortiori with the banker's letter of credit machinery. But with 
equal certainty here were assets of enormous value which, to use the 
words of Buller, J., in speaking of goods covered by an ocean bill of 
lading, could not remain "locked up" forever.165 Being highly liquid 
there was a place for them in the market. An economical use of capital 
demanded that they be brought to market. If a large strata of business 
would not conform to the banker way of life, the obvious thing to do 
was to shape financial machinery to fit the business view. The amazing 
thing is not that the factor is now doing this but that the development 
has been so long delayed, and painful. 
Taking a larger view of the matter this transition in the factor's 
business is but an eddy in the broad movement, at least two centuries 
old,166 looking toward an ever increasing liquidity.167 A vast increase 
in incorporation, negotiability accorded to the share certificate and to 
the various commodity documents, the greater standardization of goods, 
all developments of the last quarter century, have greatly accelerated 
the movement. As to why we are mobilizing an ever increasing amount 
"aIn part to cover the contingency of "charge-backs" impairing his security 
the factoring contract usually provides for advances only up to a percentage of the 
total receivables purchased. Goldwasser, supra note 150, argues for a "reasonable 
amount" rather than a fixed percentage of reserves as being more flexible. See 
e.g. Shapiro Bros. Factors Corp. v. Cherokee Silk Mills, 176 Atl. 893 (N. J. L. 
1935) where 85% was allowed. In Irving Trust Co. v. B. Lindner & Bro., 264 
N. Y. 165, 190 N, E. 332 (1934), supra note 119, a lien on the accounts was per- 
mitted even after they had been "charged back," where the contract so stipulated. 
This is consistent with the result reached in the banking "charge-back" cases. 
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham [1894] 2 Q. B. 715; Union Electric Steel 
Co. v. Imperial Bank, 286 Fed. 857 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923). 
"64Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 
636 (1925). 
18 See supra note 21. 
"The Bank of England was organized in 1692, which may fairly be said to 
have been the start of modern banking. PoWELL, EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY 
MARKET (1915) 58, 62. 
167 See also Steffen and Russell, Registered Bonds and Negotiability (1930) 
47 HARV. L. Rzv. 741. The time may have come for the Commissioners on Uni- 
form State Laws to explore the possibilities of drafting uniform factoring legisla- 
tion. 
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of property in liquid form has not been determined, or particularly 
questioned. At the same time, that "an economic structure based on 
liquidity must almost of necessity be fragile," to quote from Berle's 
brilliant essay on the subject,'68 cannot well be gainsaid, any more than 
that the device can "prove useful." Whether the new development in 
the factor's business is socially desirable or not is thus too broad a ques- 
tion to answer; but that he builds in a long tradition is evident enough. 
RosCOE T. STEFFEN 
FREDERICK S. DANZIGER 
YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1"BERLE AND PEDERSON, LIQUID CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH (1934) 12, 
13. 
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